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Introduction
The law of the European Union and the domestic law of its Member States are
closely intertwined in various and manifold ways. This is, for instance, the case
when EU directives are implemented by member states or when domestic law is
interpreted in conformity with EU law standards. However, what exactly is the
specific nature of the mutual impact of both bodies of law on the norms involved?
Considering the intense and increasingly complex interrelation of EU law and
domestic law, this question requires a fresh look. Is there, for example, supremacy
of one of the legal orders, as the case law of the European Court of Justice and of
some domestic constitutional courts seems to suggest? Do constitutional law
standards coexist on a heterarchical basis in a pluralistic setting or are they part of a
rank relationship? What role does the increasingly prominent concept of
constitutional identity play? And how should conflicts between norms be resolved?
This paper addresses the relationship between the law of the European Union
and the law of its Member States from the perspective of a theory of legal norms.
*Humboldt University Berlin. For their valuable comments on this paper, I thank the
participants of the EuConst Colloquium 2018, in particular Leonard Besselink, as well as of the
European Junior Faculty Forum 2017, in particular Mattias Kumm and Liav Orgad.
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Traditionally, the conceptualisation of this relationship has been characterised by
an approach that chooses the involved legal orders as its primary object of
reference. What has been discussed is, for instance, whether legal orders are
autonomous or mutually dependent, or whether there is a hierarchy or a pluralist
coexistence of legal orders.1 In this regard, this paper suggests an analytical and
normative shift: from the legal order as a whole to the individual legal norms. It
suggests concentrating on the specific interacting legal norms in order to
understand the interrelation of both the individual legal norms and the legal orders
concerned. The reason is that the intertwinement of legal orders happens through
the intertwinement of their norms.
This paper aims to reconceptualise the intertwinement of legal orders in the
European context and to address conflicts of norms based on this fresh approach.
In view of this, the claim of this paper is threefold: first, it holds that the
intertwinement at the level of the individual legal norms has not been sufficiently
conceptualised. Often, although the existence of the phenomenon of
intertwinement is acknowledged, the analysis does not delve into the specific
forms of intertwinement and their structural consequences at the level of legal
theory. This paper will do so by suggesting how a more nuanced understanding of
intertwinement could be achieved. Second, the paper asserts that the
understanding of this intertwinement at the level of the norm is necessary to
conceptualise the interrelations of norms and the resolution of potential conflicts.
A norm-based approach facilitates overcoming a perspectivist approach, which
focuses on how one legal order perceives its relationship with another legal order.
It allows conflicts of norms to be resolved based on a holistic understanding of
both the nature of the conflicting norms and the legal tools for resolving them.
Third, the paper claims that the existing intertwinement requires differentiated
and to some extent flexible solutions when it comes to addressing the question of
rank. Such solutions can be achieved when structural principles such as the
principles of uniformity and guaranteed constitutional identity are taken into
account.
To spell out these claims, the paper is structured as follows: the second part
outlines why a norm-based conceptual framework for the European context is
needed. The third part sketches what a norm-based conceptual framework might
look like regarding the relationship between EU law and domestic law. It
1E.g. C. Richmond, ‘Preserving the Identity Crisis: Autonomy, System and Sovereignty in
European Law’, 16 Law and Philosophy (1997) p. 377; T. Schilling, ‘The Autonomy of the
Community Legal Order: An Analysis of Possible Foundations’, 37 Harvard International Law
Journal (1996) p. 389; A. Peters, ‘Rechtsordnungen und Konstitutionalisierung: Zur
Neubestimmung der Verhältnisse’, ZÖR (2010) p. 3; N.W. Barber, ‘Legal Pluralism and the
European Union’, 12 ELJ (2006) p. 306; W. Schroeder, Das Gemeinschaftsrechtssystem (Mohr
Siebeck 2002).
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highlights the structures which emanate from the legal norms involved and their
interplay. It introduces the concept of a norm-based compound structure,
constituting an analytical and normative framework for the manifold phenomena
of interrelations between EU law and domestic law. The fourth part considers the
question of rank more closely. It offers a normative approach to resolving conflicts
between legal norms based on the structural principles guiding the relationship
between EU law and domestic law. In this regard, the principle of uniformity and
the principle of guaranteed constitutional identity is of primary importance. Based
in particular on the constitutional identity aspect, a differentiated way of
addressing conflicts of norms is suggested.
Need for a norm-based conceptual framework for the European
context
Before sketching out the norm-based conceptual framework that this paper
proposes, this section highlights the two key reasons why such a framework is
needed. The traditional concepts that deal with the relationship between EU law
and domestic law are characterised by a system-related focus. EU law and domestic
law as legal orders constitute the object of the analysis, whereas the individual legal
norms composing these orders are not given the analytical importance that they
deserve. This has led to an understanding of the relationship between EU law and
domestic law that is predominantly ‘perspectivist’ and absolute.
Adopting a norm-based conceptual framework allows us to overcome this
perspectivism. The relationship between EU law and domestic law has
traditionally been perceived from only one perspective: the perspective of either
the EU legal order or the domestic legal orders. Every legal order initially carves
out legal structures to address the existence of external norms and their potential
impact. In this context, courts – constitutional courts in particular – have played a
decisive role.2 Although such perspectivist approaches can be internally coherent,
they are not able to capture the relationship between EU law and domestic law
comprehensively. Perspectivist approaches bear the risk of contradictory claims – a
risk that has in fact materialised.3 From the perspective of EU law, EU law
2A few classic landmark decisions involving perspectivist approaches are: ECJ 15 July 1964, Case
6/64, Costa v ENEL; ECJ 17 December 1970, Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft; ECJ 9
March 1978, Case 106/77, Simmenthal II; Polish Constitutional Court, decision of 11 May 2005,
Case K 18/04; Czech Constitutional Court, decision of 8 March 2006, Case Pl. US. 50/04; German
Constitutional Court, decision of 30 June 2009, Case 2 BvE 2/08; Spanish Constitutional Court,
declaration of 13 December 2004, Case DTC 1/2004; Belgian Council of State, decision of 5
November 1996, Case n. 62.922; Italian Constitutional Court, decision of 18 December 1973,
Case n. 183/1973; Lithuanian Constitutional Court decision of 14 March 2006, Joint Cases 17/02-
24/03-22/04; French Conseil d’État, decision of 3 December 2001, Case n. 226514.
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primacy of application is absolute and does not acknowledge any exceptions; it is
based on the broader supremacy claim that EU law – and not domestic law – gets
to define what the relationship between the two is and to impose its view on
domestic law. Most domestic constitutional courts have adopted a more nuanced
approach with regard to the primacy of application, grounded however on a
conceptual supremacy claim of domestic constitutional law.4 Without such a
supremacy claim, the constitutional-identity reservation and the human-rights
reservation that many domestic constitutional courts have developed would not be
possible. These contradictory claims can affect the functioning of the individual
approaches.5 This is graphically illustrated by the absolute primacy claim of EU
law that conflicts with various domestic constitutional reservations. Such opposing
claims go against the idea of an integrated community of law.6 Taking rule of law
considerations into account, the addressees of EU law and domestic law should be
able to refer to general standards on how to resolve conflicts of norms.
Perspectivism also poses a conceptual problem: when the relationship between
two sets of norms is primarily shaped with reference to only one of these sets of
norms, the conceptual basis for a solution that claims to be valid for both is weak.
Such an approach always amounts to imposing the view of one legal order on the
other. In order to create a legal basis for the relationship between legal orders, one
perceived as legitimate by all legal orders involved, the relationship cannot be
unilaterality shaped by one legal order. A perspectivist approach thus should be
replaced by a ‘holistic cognitive frame’7 that includes both EU law and domestic
law at the analysis stage, and not only with regard to its targeted effect. The norm-
based conceptual framework suggested in this paper allows for such a broader
point of reference and thus a correspondingly broad effect.
3For a detailed analysis of the EU law and the domestic law perspective, see D. Burchardt, Die
Rangfrage im europäischen Normenverbund (Mohr Siebeck 2015) p. 66-147.
4On European jurisprudence being ‘locked in sterile opposition’, F. Giorgi and N. Triart,
‘Judges, Community Judges: Invitation to a Journey through the Looking-glass – On the Need for
Jurisdictions to Rethink the Inter-systemic Relations beyond the Hierarchical Principle’, 14 ELJ
(2008) p. 693 at p. 694. Talking about a ‘conflit radical’, D. Ritleng, ‘Le principe de primauté du
droit de l’Union’, 41 RTDE (2005) p. 285 at p. 293.
5S. Besson, ‘How international is the European legal order?’, 5 NoFo (2008) p. 50 at p. 60.
Arguing against perspectivism, A. Tietje, ‘Autonomie und Bindung der Rechtsetzung in gestuften
Rechtsordnungen’, 66 VVDStRL (2007) p. 45 at p. 51.
6Opposing claims have been qualified as ‘inimical to the very spirit of integration’ by J. Baquero
Cruz, ‘The Legacy of the Maastricht-Urteil and the Pluralist Movement’, 14 ELJ (2008) p. 389 at p.
415.
7M. Kumm, ‘The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: On the Relationship between
Constitutionalism in and beyond the State’, in J. Dunoff and J. Trachtman (eds.), Ruling the World?
Constitutionalism, International Law and Global Governance (Cambridge University Press 2009) p.
258 at p. 310.
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Second, a norm-based conceptual framework is needed in order to provide
differentiated solutions. An order-related approach aims at answering questions
concerning the relationship between EU law and domestic law uniformly for the
whole order in an absolute manner. According to such an approach, EU law and
domestic law can only interrelate as integral legal orders, with one legal order as a
whole relating to the other legal order as a whole. The result is an either-or scheme
of opposing absolutisms, with the supremacy claim either of EU law or of domestic
law coming out on top. This allows only partially, or not at all, for a differentiated
relationship between EU law and domestic law. It does not sufficiently allow
consideration of the extent to which it is possible to resolve conflicts in an
integrative manner, taking a genuine ‘as well as’ approach instead of the
underlying ‘either/or’ approach. Neither the multi-dimensional nature of legal
norms and orders nor their interrelations are fully taken into account by such an
‘either/or’ approach. A more fruitful way to conceptualise the relationship between
EU law and domestic law would be to frame the relationship between legal norms
stemming from them by taking a norm-based rather than a system-based
approach. Instead of primarily looking at the legal orders and then deducing the
consequences for conflicting legal norms, it is suggested here to primarily analyse
the relationship between legal norms. The consequences for the legal orders
involved follow from this relationship. This inversion is the core of the norm-based
conceptual framework presented in this paper.
Outline of a norm-based conceptual framework for the European
context
Before discussing the specific characteristics of the interrelations of norms within
the legal space formed by EU law and domestic law, the general characteristics
defining the normative set-up of multi-level constitutionalism is addressed as a
starting point. This allows us to highlight how these more general characteristics
are concretely reflected within the individual norms and their interrelations.
General characteristics of multi-level constitutionalism
The norm-based conceptual framework suggested in this paper is closely related to,
and builds on, concepts that theorise the relationship between different legal
orders under the premise of constitutionalisation. Constitutional pluralism8 and
8E.g. Kumm, supra n. 7; N. MacCormick, ‘Risking Constitutional Collision in Europe?’, 18
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (1998) p. 517; M.P. Maduro, ‘Courts and Pluralism: Essay on a
Theory of Judicial Adjudication in the Context of Legal and Constitutional Pluralism’, in Dunoff
and Trachtman, supra n. 7, p. 356; N. Walker, ‘The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism’, 65 MLR
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multi-level constitutionalism9 stand out when it comes to taking interrelations
between EU law and domestic law seriously. These approaches in their various
forms have established a holistic perception of EU law and domestic law as an
analytical entity: EU law and domestic law should be analysed together and not
separately when it comes to determining the relationship between them. Such a
holistic perspective does not necessarily imply classical monism.10 Rather, the
starting point of the analysis is pluralist in nature: it acknowledges the coexistence
of independent law-making entities, which create norms that are then able to
interrelate across legal orders.
These approaches have demonstrated that the European compound structure
(Verbund)11 is characterised in its very essence by the coexistence of different
elements, which from the perspective of a classically statist model of the EU seem
to be contradictory and even incompatible. These elements can be defined by three
apparent dichotomies: (1) autonomy and intertwinement; (2) dependency and
complementarity; and (3) hierarchy and heterarchy.
With regard to the first dichotomy, the point of departure is the element of
autonomy. The European legal space does not constitute a monistic unit. Rather,
the individual domestic legal orders, as well as the EU legal order, keep their
original autonomy. The autonomy addressed here can be defined as original or
theoretical,12 considering that none of these legal orders can convincingly be
described as having been derived from the other;13 they do not mutually constitute
(2002) p. 317; N. Walker, ‘Sovereignty and Differentiated Integration in the European Union’, 4
ELJ (1998) p. 355.
9See e.g. F. Mayer andM.Wendel, ‘Multilevel Constitutionalism and Constitutional Pluralism’,
in M. Avbelj and J. Komárek (eds.), Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond
(Oxford University Press 2012) p. 127; I. Pernice, ‘The Treaty of Lisbon: Multilevel
constitutionalism in action’, 15 Columbia Journal of European Law (2009) p. 349. See also R.
Barents, ‘The Fallacy of European Multilevel Constitutionalism’, in Avbelj and Komárek ibid.,
p. 153.
10This (mis)understanding seems to be at the basis of the critical consideration by M. Avbelj,
‘Questioning EU Constitutionalism’, 9 German Law Journal (2008) p. 1 at p. 19-20. On the
compound idea being an ordering and organisational concept, E. Schmidt-Aßmann, ‘Einleitung’, in
E Schmidt-Aßmann and B. Schöndorf-Haubold (eds.), Der Europäische Verwaltungsverbund (Mohr
Siebeck 2005) p. 1 at p. 7.
11 In German scholarship on EU law, the term ‘Verbund’ (compound) has been used in various
contexts including with regard to the interrelation of constitutions, administrative actors and
structures and of constitutional courts. E.g. I. Pernice, ‘Europäisches und nationales
Verfassungsrecht’, 60 VVDStRL (2001) p. 148; Schmidt-Aßmann, supra n. 10; A. Voßkuhle,
‘Der europäische Verfassungsgerichtsverbund’, NVwZ (2010) p. 1.
12Schilling, supra n. 1; Peters, supra n. 1, p. 31 ff.
13For such attempts, see e.g. Richmond, supra n. 1; W. Grussmann, ‘Grundnorm und
Supranationalität’, in T. von Danwitz et al. (eds.), Auf dem Weg zu einer Europäischen Staatlichkeit
(Boorberg 1993) p. 47. Critical Burchardt, supra n. 3, p. 156-168.
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their basis of validity in the Kelsenian sense.14 Yet the element of autonomy alone
does not paint the full picture. These legal orders are intertwined by the
interrelations between their norms. As a result, their autonomous nature is only
relative. The legal orders have opened themselves up and become permeable15 in
order to allow external elements to interact with internal norms. The individual
norms engage in an interplay not only linking them occasionally but creating a
permanent interconnection between the legal orders. Therefore, the
intertwinement is situated both at the level of the legal norms and at the level of
the legal orders, with the latter being a consequence of the former.16 This is not
accidental, but expresses a systemic design. Both elements, autonomy and
intertwinement, are mutually dependent: without legal orders being originally
autonomous, the legal norms constituting the compound structure would not be
able to interrelate;17 conversely, without intertwinement, the individual legal
orders could not uphold their autonomy while remaining part of the compound
structure.
The second conceptual pair is dependence and complementarity.18 Multiple
legal norms formally stemming from different legal orders can be substantially
dependent on each other. This dependence occurs when a legal norm has to fulfil
certain conditions stemming from both its legal order of origin and external
influences. For instance, a domestic norm transposing an EU directive is (partially)
dependent on EU law; general principles of EU law are partially dependent on
domestic law. This aspect is developed further below. Here, it suffices to mention
that the existing links of dependence between individual norms reflect the more
structural dependencies at the level of the legal orders. Furthermore, legal norms
can – without being formally or substantively dependent on other norms –
complement each other. This can be witnessed at the level of norm application, for
instance when domestic norms are interpreted in accordance with EU law.
Another element of complementarity is cooperation which has been central to
compound-related concepts of constitutional and administrative matters.19
14On the cognitive nature of the kelsenian approach, see Richmond, supra n. 1, p. 408.
15M. Wendel, Permeabilität im europäischen Verfassungsrecht (Mohr Siebeck 2011) p. 8.
16This link is also expressed both by the terms ‘bridging mechanism’ and ‘métissage’: Walker,
supra n. 8, p. 375; I. Raducu and N. Levrat, ‘Le métissage des ordres juridiques européens’, 43
Cahiers de droit européen (2007) p. 111. On ‘interlegality’: B. de Sousa Santos, ‘Law: A Map of
Misreading. Towards a Postmodern Conception of Law’, 14 Journal of Law and Society (1987) p.
279 at p. 298.
17That is the reason for this concept to be grounded on legal pluralism; see Mayer and Wendel,
supra n. 9, p. 133.
18Pernice, supra n. 11, p. 175; see also C. Calliess, Die neue Europäische Union nach dem Vertrag
von Lissabon (Mohr Siebeck 2010) p. 69.
19E.g. G. Sydow, Verwaltungskooperation in der Europäischen Union (Mohr Siebeck 2004) p.
118 ff.
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Lastly, the compound structure of the European legal space is characterised by
coexisting hierarchical and heterarchical elements. This is reflected by the
conception of multi-level structures within the EU.20 The ‘level’ terminology
contains a certain hierarchical connotation. The allegorical element of hierarchy is
the primacy claim attributed to EU law by the European Court of Justice. The
heterarchical element is expressed, inter alia, when the ‘polycentric structure’ or the
shared sovereignty amongst the constitutional levels is emphasised.21 Horizontal
networks of administrative cooperation show a similar orientation.22 Details of
this coexistence will be highlighted in the fourth part of this paper.
The norm-based conceptual framework suggested here refers to all these
characteristics for the compound structure of the EU, yet without confining itself
to the limits of concepts such as multi-level constitutionalism. Rather, the paper
will shed more nuanced light on the design of the normative structure of the
European legal space.
Specific characteristics of the norm-based compound structure
The general characteristics of a compound structure like the one formed by EU law
and domestic law only serve to describe the features of the interrelating legal orders
in broad terms. They reflect the more specific normative structures created by the
interplay of legal norms. In order to get to the bottom of these general features, this
section considers the emerging structures more closely. It highlights that the
interrelations between EU law and domestic law constitute a compound structure
that is expressively norm-related. The general characteristics of this European
compound structure (autonomy and intertwinement, dependency and
complementarity, hierarchy and heterarchy) resonate within the individual legal
norms and their relationship to each other.
Combined normativity
The first structural element characteristic of the compound structure is the
phenomenon of combined normativity. This results from a legal pluralist set-up:
different domestic and European legislatures coexist and create norms both
independently of each other and in mutual cooperation.23 As a consequence, legal
20E.g. Pernice, supra n. 9, p. 379 ff.
21E.g. T. Kingreen, ‘Grundfreiheiten’, in A. von Bogdandy and J. Bast (eds.), Europäisches
Verfassungsrecht, 2nd edn (Springer 2009) p. 705 at p. 725; Pernice, supra n. 11, p. 175.
22T. Siegel, Entscheidungsfindung im Verwaltungsverbund (Mohr Siebeck 2009) p. 37 ff, p. 320 ff.
23Besson, supra n. 5, p. 54; Wendel, supra n. 15, p. 14. More generally N.MacCormick, ‘Beyond
the Sovereign State’, 56 MLR (1993) p. 1; J.H.H. Weiler, ‘The Reformation of European
Constitutionalism’, 35 JCMS (1997) p. 97; P. Eleftheriadis, ‘Begging the Constitutional Question’,
36 JCMS (1998) p. 255.
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norms of different formal origins claim validity and applicability in a parallel
manner. This is an element of the autonomy of legal orders. The ‘parallel
normativity’ is, however, only the first step. Some norms are formally as well as
substantively determined by different origins. For instance, a ‘domestic’ norm
created in the implementation of an EU directive as well as a ‘European’ norm
shaped as a general principle of law combine both EU-law and domestic-law
elements. In such cases, when aspects of different origins are fused, a ‘combined
normativity’ is created.24 This transcends the traditional understanding of separate
law-creating entities, of one legal norm being created by only a single legislature.
The combined normativity that can be witnessed in the European context has a
formal and a substantive dimension. The formal dimension relates to the process of
norm-creation. From a classically Kelsenian perspective, a legal norm can only be
considered to validly exist if it is created according to the standards set by a specific
legal order.25 In a norm-based compound structure, however, a more open model
of normativity is in place. Elements of the process of norm-creation can stem from
different legal orders. This approach does not amount to dissolving the connection
between a norm and a legal order or to creating an entirely new third category of
norms beside domestic and EU law norms. Rather, combined normativity
emphasises that the link between a norm and a legal order is not always exclusive;
multiple links can coexist. A norm can be both domestic and European in nature.
In order to understand the combined nature of normativity, it is important to
keep in mind that one legal norm can be derived from another in different ways:
with regard to competences, a norm can determine whether a law-making entity is
competent to create another norm, i.e. whether it can do so. In addition, by
creating an imperative, a norm can determine whether a law-making entity shall
create another norm. Now, it is possible that one norm sets the imperative and
creates the competence – but this can also be done by two different norms. For
instance, when an EU directive is implemented, the competence for law-making is
attributed by domestic constitutional law, whereas the imperative order regarding
the ‘if’ and ‘how’ of the law-making primarily stems from EU law. The formally
domestic norm had to be created in order to fulfil the EU law obligation; at the
same time, its creation was enabled by the domestic legal framework.26 Another
24Using the term ‘normes métisses’, Raducu and Levrat, supra n. 16, p. 113.
25H. Kelsen, ‘Der Begriff der Rechtsordnung’, in Hans R. Klecatsky et al. (eds), Die Wiener
Rechtstheoretische Schule (vol. 2, 1968) p. 1395 and p. 1400. See also M. Jestaedt, ‘Der Europäische
Verfassungsverbund’, in R. Krause et al. (eds.), Recht der Wirtschaft und der Arbeit in Europa
(Duncker & Humblot 2004) p. 637 and p. 658. Similarly, the approaches by Hart and Raz are
order-related as well: a principle of authoritative recognition determines whether a legal norm
belongs to a specific legal order and therefore whether it is valid. See J. Raz, The Concept of a Legal
System (Oxford University Press 1970) p. 190; H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Clarendon Press
1965) p. 92 at p. 97 ff.
81The law of the European Union and the law its Member States
example of norms derived both from domestic and EU law are general principles
of law. Whereas the element of competence can be linked to Article 19(1) TEU,
the imperative element of norm creation is situated within domestic law.27
The result of this process of norm creation is a norm-based intertwinement.
That which is created during the process of implementation is not merely a legal
norm of a domestic law nature. Taking the impact of implementation on the
resulting norm seriously requires going beyond the formal origin of the norm. A
legal norm of a hybrid legal nature is created.28 Its character is hybrid in the sense
that the resulting legal norm is composed by both domestic and European
elements of legal normativity: at face value, the norm is of domestic origin since it
has been set by the domestic legislature. However, its character cannot be reduced
to that origin. Analytically, it must be taken into account that the creation of this
domestic norm has been triggered by a norm of EU law.
The substantive dimension of combined normativity relates to the content of a
legal norm and its effect. The content of a norm can be defined by norms
stemming from different legal orders, thereby creating a substantially hybrid norm
and, therefore, a substantive dimension of intertwinement. The most prominent
example is, once again, the implementation of directives into domestic law. In this
context, the EU law norm can directly determine the content of the norm formally
stemming from domestic law. Depending on whether the directive allows leeway
for implementation, the content is partially or entirely pre-determined.
Consequently, the resultant norm is a combination of European and domestic
normative input. Thus, the legal norm is hybrid in the sense that it is composed of
substantive elements stemming from both domestic and European law.
A second example of hybrid norm content follows from norm interpretation.
Be it the interpretation of domestic law in line with EU law29 or of EU law in line
26Some constitutional courts of the Member States have hinted at such a differentiated
understanding of norm-creation in the European context, see e.g. the Czech Constitutional Court in
its decision of 8 March 2006 – Pl. US. 50/04, part VI. A: ‘(T)he Constitutional Court cannot
entirely overlook the impact of Community law on the formation, application, and interpretation of
national law, all the more so in a field of law where the creation, operation, and aim of its provisions
is immediately bound up with Community law. In other words, in this field the Constitutional
Court interprets constitutional law taking into account the principles arising from Community law’.
27However, there can be disagreement about whether an imperative set by an EU law norm
requires an ‘enabling’ basis of competence stemming from domestic law or whether this competence
is rather part of the EU norm.
28 It should be stressed that it is the actual legal norm and not ‘merely’ the legal space which is
characterised by hybridity. On the ‘hybridity of legal spaces’: P. Schiff Berman, ‘Global Legal
Pluralism’, 80 Southern California Law Review (2007) p. 1155.
29On this mechanism, see K. Lenaerts and T. Corthaut, ‘Of birds and hedges: the role of primacy
in invoking norms of EU law’, 31 ELRev (2006) p. 287 at p. 292 ff; ECJ 10 April 1984, Case 14/83,
Von Colson and Kamann v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, para. 26; ECJ 10 April 1984, Case 79/83,
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with domestic constitutional law30 – domestic law and EU law both influence the
content of the norm as it is applied. During the process of application, a normative
element is added to the content of the norm. The original content is opened up to
external influences and complemented or even modified by it.31 The resulting
normative conglomerate is an expression of complementarity in the European
compound structure. Conversely, EU law is dependent on the application of
domestic law if it aims at influencing domestic norms through interpretation.
Inter-order interpretation thus reflects both complementarity and dependency.
General principles of law are a third example of combined substantive
normativity and hybrid norm content. This is a concept developed by the
European Court of Justice in order to fill in existing normative gaps in EU law.32
Using the instrument of evaluative legal comparison, the Court extracts the
common normative substrate from the totality of relevant domestic norms; it then
forms the corresponding EU law norm on that basis. Thus, the domestic law
norms exercise an indirect normative effect. The combined domestic normative
imperatives are transformed into an EU law norm, as reflected in Article 6(3)
TEU. The court is bound by the normative imperative of taking domestic law into
account while concretising it into an EU law norm33 and adapting it to the
standards set by the overall framework of EU law.34 This mechanism fulfils an
integrative function and realises substantive complementarity.35
Dorit Harz v Deutsche Tradax GmbH, para. 26. The legal basis for an obligation to an interpretation
of domestic law in line with EU law can be seen in Art. 4(3) TEU and Art. 288 TFEU and is
complemented in some domestic legal orders by a constitutional obligation of this kind. See e.g.
Czech Constitutional Court, decision of 3 May 2006, Pl. ÚS 66/04, para. 61: ‘A constitutional
principle can be derived from Article 1 para. 2 of the Constitution, in conjunction with the principle
of cooperation laid down in Article 10 of the EC Treaty, according to which domestic legal
enactments, including the constitution, should be interpreted in conformity with the principles of
European integration and the cooperation between Community and Member State organs’.
30See A. Peters, Elemente einer Theorie der Verfassung Europas (Duncker &Humblot 2001) p. 289
ff. With respect to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, Art. 52(4) explicitly stipulates an
interpretative obligation. For a general obligation regarding the whole of EU law, the discussed
foundations include Art. 4(2) and (3) TEU, Art. 5(3) TEU, Art. 19(1) TFEU as well as Art. 167(1)
and (4) TFEU.
31On this effect, see also Raducu and Levrat, supra n. 16, p. 118; S Oeter,
‘Rechtsprechungskonkurrenz zwischen nationalen Verfassungsgerichten, Europäischem
Gerichtshof und Europäischem Gerichtshof für Menschenrechte’, 66 VVDStRL (2007) p. 361 at
p. 382.
32ECJ 12 July 1957, Joint Cases 7/56 and 3/57 - 7/57 Algera and Others v Assemblée commune.
33On the necessity of concretisation, see Wendel, supra n. 15, p. 542.
34As Advocate General Roemer has put it: ‘[A] process of assessment in which above all the
particular objectives of the Treaty and the peculiarities of the Community structure must be taken
into account’: Opinion of 13 July 1971, Case 5/71, Schöppenstedt.
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In sum, several observations can be made on combined normativity. First,
combined normativity reflects multiple elements. It is an expression both of the
dependence and the complementarity of legal norms in the interplay between
domestic law and EU law. Legal norms complement each other, for instance in the
context of the interpretation of domestic law in line with EU law. In other
circumstances, they even depend on each other, as in the case of the
implementation of EU directives. Second, combined normativity shows that the
intertwinement of legal orders takes place at the level of the legal norms. Not only
the legal orders as systemic entities but even their very components, the legal
norms, are intertwined with regard to their creation and content. Third, combined
normativity causes traditional lines between legal orders to be blurred. The hybrid
nature of many norms in the European legal space bear witness to that. Fourth,
such hybrid norms make strict hierarchies between norms impossible. Hierarchies
generally require linear relationships of derivation which are not always present in
a compound structure.
Multi-level structure within the legal norms
Beside combined normativity, the European legal space is characterised by a multi-
level structure within the legal norms. Not only the compound of legal orders as a
whole but also the very norms have different dimensions which can be described as
multi-level. It is submitted here that these dimensions create a ‘horizontal set of
orders’, with every legal norm being part of both orders. One of these ‘horizontal’
orders is related to the validity of legal norms, the other to their application. Both
orders have different elements and structures and are determined by different
parameters. Accordingly, in varying contexts, norms and their relationships are not
always determined by the same parameters. Considering the multi-level structure
within the norms allows overcoming legal orders as the only point of reference for
understanding the relations between norms. Norms are not merely grouped into
‘norms belonging to a domestic legal order’ and ‘norms belonging to the EU legal
order’; they are also part of the ‘horizontal’ orders of norm application and of norm
validity.
This differentiation between validity and application of legal orders is present in
the case law of various courts in the European context. A prominent example in
this regard is the decision of the Spanish Constitutional Court of 13 December
2004 on the compatibility of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe
with the Spanish constitution.36 Here, the court based its distinction between
35On this integrative function, see C. Sobotta, Transparenz in den Rechtsetzungsverfahren der
Europäischen Union (Nomos 2001) p. 305.
36Spanish Constitutional Court, declaration DTC 1/2004 of 13 December 2004. Critical of this
distinction, Baquero Cruz, supra n. 6, p. 415.
84 Dana Burchardt EuConst 15 (2019)
primacy and supremacy37 on the different orders regarding application and
validity when it stated: ‘Supremacy and primacy are categories which are
developed in differentiated orders. The former, in that of the application of valid
regulations; the latter, in that of regulatory procedures’. Similar differentiations
have been made by the Polish and the German constitutional courts38 and the
European Court of Justice.39
The ‘horizontal’ ordering structure concerning the validity of legal norms is
based on a concept of validity that is partially abstracted from the legal order.40 As
described above, various law-making entities coexist on an equal basis and cause
legal norms to be considered valid both in their legal order of origin and in external
legal orders. Thus, the effect of a norm is not exclusively on the group of addressees
belonging to the legal order of origin; that group includes external addressees.
However, this is only true once the initial existence of a norm has been
determined. The initial questions of whether a norm can at all enter the validity-
related ordering structure and which is the yardstick of the norm’s existence is
characterised by a strong emphasis on autonomy: whether a norm stemming from
one legal order is considered valid or whether it should be abrogated is only
determined by reference to that legal order’s norms. This exclusive yardstick for
abrogation emphasises the self-referential nature of legal orders. For the secondary
law of the EU, the European Court of Justice has formulated this as follows:
‘Recourse to the legal rules or concepts of national law in order to judge the
validity of measures adopted by the institutions of the Community would have an
adverse effect on the uniformity and efficacy of Community law. The validity of
such measures can only be judged in the light of Community law’.41 This shows
that, although EU law norms can be determined by domestic law in certain
contexts, the immediate yardstick for their continuously binding force is
exclusively the EU legal framework. Only EU law rules decide whether or not a
norm of EU law origin is valid in this sense.
This emphasis on autonomy is grounded on the ‘destructive’ connotation of the
abrogation yardstick – as compared to the ‘constructive’ orientation of aspects
pertaining to the creation or interpretation of norms. An abrogation through
external norms would be perceived as interference, not as complementation of the
original legal framework.42 As a consequence, the abrogation yardstick of domestic
37See on this distinction M. Avbelj, ‘Supremacy or Primacy of EU Law – (Why) Does it Matter?’,
17 ELJ (2011) p. 744.
38Polish Constitutional Court, decision of 11 May 2005, K 18/04; German Constitutional
Court, decision of 30 June 2009, 2 BvE 2/08, para. 334.
39ECJ 22 October 1998, Joint Cases C-10/97 to C-22/97,Ministero delle Finanze v IN.CO.GE.
‘90, para. 21.
40 Jestaedt, supra n. 25, p. 658.
41 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, supra n. 2, para. 3.
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law is also exclusively determined by its respective domestic law framework.
Corresponding with that which is claimed by EU law, domestic law too has its
own autonomous yardstick. This leads to parallel standards within the compound
structure. Whether a norm of domestic law origin is valid or should be abrogated is
only determined by the relevant domestic rules; EU law has no say in that.
Accordingly, the European Court of Justice has explicitly rejected the idea that the
primacy of EU law as understood by the Court could affect the validity of
domestic legal norms.43 This guarantees that, in the overall compound structure,
the element of intertwinement is counterbalanced by the element of autonomy.
To a certain extent, however, there is a counterweight to the predominance of
the autonomy element within the ‘horizontal’ ordering structure of norm validity.
Through the mechanism of direct effect, the self-referentiality of legal orders is
attenuated. In this paper, ‘direct effect’ refers to the abstract normative force
exercised by EU law in the domestic legal orders and not (yet) to the immediate
invocability by the addressees of the norms as expressed here by the term ‘direct
applicability’.44 Allowing EU law to have a normative impact on domestic law
without an act of transformation,45 direct effect helps to overcome the strictly
limited effect of a norm linked to a legal order. Legal norms can have a legal effect
outside their order of origin. Consequently, the point of reference for the effect of
a legal norm is no longer exclusively its respective legal order; instead, the
compound structure, as a whole, functions as the point of reference. Without
giving up the relative autonomy of the participating legal orders, the norm-based
compound structure serves as a ‘bridge’ upon which the external effect of norms is
grounded.46 At the structural level, this represents a major element of the
intertwinement of legal orders.
The second ‘horizontal’ ordering structure concerns the application of legal
norms. Applying a norm means actualising its normative claim in the specific
context of the case at hand. Prima facie, the compound structure allows for norms
to interrelate at the level of norm application in a way that is independent of their
original legal orders. Only in case of conflict can the origin once again become
relevant (see below). The components of this application-related order are the
principles of direct applicability, uniform application of norms, and equivalence.
42On a concept of autonomy related to the freedom of interference from external norms, see
Peters, supra n. 30, p. 274 ff.
43Ministero delle Finanze v IN.CO.GE. ‘90, supra n. 39, para. 21.
44 It should be noted, however, that the terms ‘direct effect’ and ‘direct applicability’ are used by
some authors in the inverse sense. This paper opts for a use of these terms that better reflects their
content. On the problematic terminological blurriness, see also Wendel, supra n. 15, p. 377.
45Simmenthal II, supra n. 2, para. 14/16.
46See also Besson, supra n. 5, p. 62-63.
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The principle of direct applicability of EU law, based on the case law of the
European Court of Justice in the Van Gend en Loos decision,47 is decisive. It
enables the relevant EU law norms to enter into a relationship with domestic
norms at the level of norm application. The groups of addressees of EU law and
domestic law are somewhat harmonised. This is a crucial step for an application-
related interrelation of norms and for the intertwinement of domestic law and EU
law. However, EU law is of course only directly applicable if it contains clear and
unconditional obligations for the Member States or individuals. This highlights
the need for a norm-based understanding of the relationship between EU law and
domestic law – the nature of every individual norm determines both its effect and
its interaction with other norms. In addition, the conditionality of direct
applicability reflects the fact that there is no absolute and comprehensive
intertwinement of EU law and domestic law; rather, this intertwinement is only
one element among others of the compound structure. Direct applicability can be
understood as the expression of a structural principle of uniformity (described in
the fourth part below) which has an only relative effect and can be balanced with
other structural principles.
The principle of uniform application of norms reflects the high harmonising
tendency characteristic of norm application in the compound structure. The
European Court of Justice has established the principle that all norms of EU law
have to be applied and interpreted throughout the entire European legal space in a
uniform manner.48 This is based on the idea that all EU citizens should be treated
equally regarding the application of the law.49 A parallel concept exists in domestic
legal orders when it comes to the uniform application of domestic law within the
respective legal order, guaranteed by the harmonising case law of supreme and
constitutional courts. This parallelism enables domestic and EU law to form a
‘horizontal’ ordering structure related to the application of norms. However, this
uniformity is again not absolute, as demonstrated by directives that leave leeway in
implementation, by enhanced cooperation (Article 20 TEU, Article 326 ff
TFEU), and by the protection clauses concerning domestic law-making (e.g.
Articles 114(10) and 191(2) TFEU).50
The principle of equivalence relates more strongly to domestic legal orders. It
aims at harmonising domestic facts and circumstances. ‘[T]he rules and
47ECJ 5 February 1963, Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos.
48ECJ 21 February 1991, Joint Cases C-143/88 and C-92/89, Zuckerfabrik Süderdithmarschen,
para. 26; ECJ 5 March 1996, Joint Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93, Brasserie du pêcheur, para. 33.
Barents even describes the uniform applicability as ‘raison d’être’ of EU law, see R. Barents, The
Autonomy of Community Law (Kluwer 2004) p. 183.
49ECJ 6 June 1972, Case 94/71, Schlüter and Maack, para. 11.
50See also P. Huber, ‘Differenzierte Integration und Flexibilität als neues Ordnungsmuster der
Europäischen Union?’, 31 EuR (1996) p. 347.
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procedures laid down by national law must not have the effect of making it
virtually impossible to implement Community regulations and national legislation
must be applied in a manner which is not discriminatory compared to procedures
for deciding similar but purely national disputes’.51 In this context, EU law is not
the tool for, but rather the object of, harmonisation. EU law and domestic law
should be applied without differentiation. Prima facie, the principle of equivalence
and the principle of uniform application have opposite effects: equivalence with
domestic standards results in a diversified procedural landscape for EU law.
However, this is not contradictory because a harmonisation of this procedural
aspect is not intended. Rather, the principle of equivalence offers a considerable
advantage for the ‘horizontal’ ordering structure related to norm application.
Based on this, EU law norms are embedded consistently into the normative
context of norm application in a specific case.52 The uniformity of the domestic
legal order is guaranteed as there is no special procedural framework for EU law.
Thus, the application of all norms (of either domestic or EU origin) is harmonised
for this legal order. For those tasked with applying the law in a domestic legal
order, the standards for norm application appear unified. Consistency as an
element of uniformity is hence one of the defining features of the application of
norms in the European context.
In sum, these components show that the ‘horizontal’ ordering structure
concerning the application of legal norms is defined by a high level of uniformity,
without that uniformity being absolutely determinative. This insight is important
for constructing a framework that addresses the question of conflicts between
norms in the European compound structure. Such a framework is discussed in the
following section.
Rethinking the ‘rank’ between EU law and domestic law
After considering, in the previous part of the paper, the relationship between legal
norms in the European compound structure, this part takes a fresh look at the
question of a potential ranking of EU law and domestic law. It highlights how the
question of rank can be addressed in the light of a norm-related approach and how
conflicts of norms can be resolved in a norm-based compound structure. The
compound structure has both an analytical and a normative dimension;53 this part
of the paper implements the latter. It draws on principles that structure the totality
of norms stemming from different legal orders – in particular, the principle of
51ECJ 21 September 1983, Joint Cases 205/82 -215/82, Deutsche Milchkontor GmbH, para. 19.
52Raducu and Levrat, supra n. 16, p. 135.
53On the normative dimension of multilevel constitutionalism, Mayer and Wendel, supra n. 9,
p. 138.
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uniformity and the principle of guaranteed constitutional identity – and uses them
to offer normative guidance for resolving conflicts of norms.
A norm-based approach to the rank question: point of departure
Rather than thinking about a potential rank between legal orders and norms as a
pre-existing reality, one should conceive of this issue as a process of constructing
the relationship between norms and orders. In the absence of an absolute or
intrinsic rank between legal orders, a ranking of legal norms can be constructed by
following an evolutionary process. Norms enter into a concretely ranked
relationship for a specific case at hand when a conflict between them is resolved
in favour of one of the norms involved. Such a concretely ranked relationship can
be constructed in various ways including using structural principles like the ones
suggested below. Structural principles can rank norms – those principles, however,
are not hierarchically ordered and relate to each other by balancing. This method
emphasises ranking as a process; one that involves hierarchical as well as
heterarchical elements.54
The elements described in the third part of this paper have important
consequences for the process of constructing a rank between individual norms in
particular cases. First, the multi-level structure within the norms establishing two
different ‘horizontal’ ordering structures related to the validity and the application
of norms shows that it is only at the level of application that conflicts of norms
need to be resolved. Consequently, the parameters of the application-related
ordering structure – first and foremost the element of uniformity – are
predominant when it comes to resolving conflicts of norms. Inversely, the
validity-related ordering structure remains unaffected by such a process of
application-related ranking.55 Its effects are confined to the specific norm
application at hand. Also, situating norm conflicts at the level of norm application
means that only such norms which are actually part of the application-related
54By accepting the ranking dimension as one of the components of the relationship between EU
law and domestic law, the approach suggested in this paper takes an explicitly different stance from
those approaches to legal pluralism that categorically deny the possibility of hierarchical elements, see
G. Itzcovich, ‘Legal Order, Legal Pluralism, Fundamental Principles. Europe and Its Law in Three
Concepts’, 18 ELJ (2012) p. 358 at p. 370.
55This corresponds to the concept of ‘EU law primacy’ as developed in an application-related
manner by the ECJ and taken up by some domestic constitutional courts. See e.g. Estonian High
Court, opinion Nr. 3-4-1-3-06 of 11 May 2006, para. 16; German Constitutional Court, decision
of 6 July 2010, 2 BvR 2661/06, para. 53; Spanish Constitutional Court, decision of 13 December
2004, DTC 1/2004; Czech Constitutional Court, decision of 8March 2006, Pl. US. 50/04, part VI.
A; Polish Constitutional Court, decision of 11May 2005, K 18/04, paras. 4.2, 6.4, 10.2; Lithuanian
Constitutional Court, decision of 14 March 2006, Joint Cases 17/02-24/03-22/04, section III,
para. 9.4.
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ordering structure can enter into conflict: for EU law, direct applicability is
required.56
Second, the element of combined normativity affects how or whether an
individual norm is attributed to hierarchically related groups of norms. The
substantive interrelations of legal norms make it impossible to establish purely
formal hierarchies of orders. Bearing in mind the normative intertwinement,
norms formally stemming from different orders cannot be ranked exclusively with
respect to their system of origin. Instead, a more flexible and differentiated
approach is required in order to reflect the specificities of each norm and each
interrelation. It is critical to consider that the immediate objects of conflict are
specific norms and not legal orders. It is the specific content of individual norms
that might be divergent, not the entirety of the legal orders concerned. A focus on
the legal order is, therefore, neither necessary nor helpful. On the contrary, this
would cement the idea of monolithic blocs that are not only impermeable but also
opposed to each other.
With regard to resolving conflicts of norms, existing conflict rules must, at a
minimum, be applied in a way that takes into account that a considerable number
of norms within the European compound structure are of a hybrid nature.
Especially when a hybrid norm results from a process of implementation, the
ranking in a situation of conflict should not exclusively relate to the formal nature
of the norm. If, for example, a domestic norm that implements an EU law norm
conflicts with a ‘purely’ domestic norm, the conflict resolution has to take the
hybrid nature of the former into account. This might result in the hybrid norm
trumping – because of its EU law element – a conflicting domestic norm that
formally would be hierarchically superior by purely domestic standards. Likewise,
the hybrid but formally domestic norm could, in another constellation of
conflicting norms, trump an EU law norm on the basis of the consideration that
the content of the hybrid norm reflects an EU law norm that might be considered
superior to the latter EU law norm.
However, as all these scenarios presume the existence of a conflict rule, it is
crucial to first consider what actually guides or should guide the resolution of
conflicts in the European context. This question is answered in the following
section.
56There is a controversy as to whether the primacy of EU law requires direct applicability.
However, this debate relates to diverging concepts of what primacy actually means. E.g. contra:
Lenaerts and Corthaut, supra n. 29, p. 290 ff; pro e.g.: T. Kruis, Der Anwendungsvorrang des EU-
Rechts in Theorie und Praxis (Mohr Siebeck 2013) p. 49-50.
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Structural principles as basis for conflict resolution
The approach suggested in this paper uses structural principles as a point of
reference for resolving conflicts between legal norms. The term ‘structural
principles’ refers to those principles that structure the totality of norms stemming
from different legal orders. In other words, they are not principles only stemming
from, and having effect in, one single legal order. More precisely, they are not
merely principles of EU law, such as the EU law principle of primacy. Rather, they
reflect the interplay of all legal norms originating from the intertwined legal orders
and thus are, to an extent, ‘meta-principles’. They are, however, neither detached
from nor independent of the domestic and EU legal orders. Rather, they are
rooted in these legal orders; their normative origin is in EU law and domestic law.
In this capacity, structural principles can serve as a common and holistic basis for
the resolution of conflicts between norms stemming from these different orders.
They allow for the necessary flexibility required by the heterogenic European
compound structure and the corresponding qualitative plurality of conflict
situations. They also permit the gradual harmonisation of concrete conflict
resolution based on common standards.
In the European context, this paper argues that one can recognise two specific
structural principles which are better suited to the particularities created by the
intertwinement of domestic law and EU law than other more general principles:57
the principle of uniformity and the principle of guaranteed constitutional identity.
These principles need to be interlinked. In the interest of differentiated conflict
resolution, this should be done by considering the cooperation aspect to be one of
the characteristic elements of multilevel constitutionalism.
Principle of uniformity
The principle of uniformity aims at optimising legal uniformity and homogeneity
within the European compound structure. It is especially reflected by the legal
mechanisms of direct and uniform application of EU law. As described above, law
application in the European context is guided by the premise of uniformity.
Uniformity also plays a crucial role during law making when it aims at
harmonising legal standards.58 Uniformity is intended to guarantee the equal
treatment of all EU citizens within the EU, emphasising the perspective of the
legal subjects by its reference to non-discrimination and legality.59 Thus, the
57For more general approaches based on structural principals, Besson, supra n. 5, p. 65; M.
Kumm, ‘Rethinking Constitutional Authority: On the Structure and Limits of Constitutional
Pluralism’, in Avbelj and Komárek, supra n. 9, p. 39 at p. 55 ff. For a discussion of why principles
such as legality, subsidiarity, human rights protection and democracy do not provide sufficient
guidance in the European constitutional setting, see D. Burchardt, Die Rangfrage im europäischen
Normenverbund (Mohr Siebeck 2015) p. 266-276.
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principle of legality constitutes one of the foundations of structural uniformity. It
requires, inter alia, that the application of norms should be as consistent as
possible. According to this requirement, the interrelations of norms, in general,
should be guided by the consideration of consistency. Decisions about the
application of norms should be taken in a way that is consistent with previous
decisions.60 However, the principle of uniformity is not an absolute feature of the
European legal space.61 Rather, it is open to balancing with other structural
principles.
In the event of conflicting legal norms, the principle of uniformity is of
eminent importance for establishing the relationship between norms in a specific
case. It can be used as a basis for formulating a concrete standard for the ranking of
conflicting norms. If conceived as a structural principle, the principle of
uniformity requires the individual relationships of norms to be streamlined in
terms of uniformity: the individual legal norms have to be scrutinised with regard to
what positive effect they can have for uniformity. (It should be noted that uniformity
here refers to uniformity within the compound structure as a whole and not
merely within one of the participating legal orders.) If the result of this scrutiny is
diverging from one of the norms affecting uniformity more positively than the
other norm, the norm with the higher potential for homogeneity should be
applied. Put differently, it is suggested here that the principle of uniformity
requires the following: the norm that allows for a more comprehensive uniformity of
application within the European compound structure should prevail.
As a result, hierarchical relationships between groups of norms arise. For norms
that are formally of EU law origin, one can generally assume that they have a high
potential for uniformity.62 These norms are not only substantially inspired by the
objective of harmonisation, but they are also able to guarantee uniformity by
means of the mechanisms of direct effect and applicability. For domestic law
58On the link between the uniformity principle and harmonisation, see also G. van der Schyff,
‘The Constitutional Relationship between the European Union and its Member States: The Role of
National Identity in Article 4(2) TEU’, 37 ELRev (2012) p. 563 at p. 582.
59On the aspect of uniform effect and application of law as guarantee for the equality of legal
subjects, see M. Nettesheim, ‘Der Grundsatz der einheitlichen Wirksamkeit des
Gemeinschaftsrechts’, in A. Randelzhofer et al. (eds.), Gedächtnisschrift Grabitz (CH Beck 1995)
p. 447 at p. 448 ff.
60M.P. Maduro, ‘Contrapunctual Law: Europe’s Constitutional Pluralism in Action’, in N.
Walker (ed.), Sovereignty in Transition (Hart 2003) p. 501 at p. 527.
61On such an absolute understanding of the unity of EU law being ‘the very essence’ of EU law,
see Barents, supra n. 48, p. 213-214.
62This aspect is also reflected in the order of 23 November 2016, n. 24/2017 of the Italian
Constitutional Court: ‘The primacy of EU law (…) reflects the conviction that the objective of unity,
within the context of a legal order that ensures peace and justice between nations, justifies the
renunciation of areas of sovereignty, even if defined through constitutional law’.
92 Dana Burchardt EuConst 15 (2019)
norms, this is generally not the case as their immediate effect is limited to a single
legal order. Thus, most scenarios involving cross-order conflicts of norms will have
the traditionally established outcome: a norm with a formal origin in EU law will
prevail vis-à-vis a norm of formally domestic origin. The application of the EU law
norm guarantees the broader application of the same standard, whereas the
application of the domestic norm would be confined to its ‘own’ domestic
legal order.
Taking the hybrid nature of many norms within the European compound
structure into account, the norm-specific rank relationship can, however, also be
developed more fully: for instance, a formally domestic norm transposing an EU
directive can prevail vis-à-vis a ‘purely’ domestic norm, the reason being that the
element of uniformity is more pronounced in the former than in the latter, taking
into account its origin in the directive and the harmonisation purpose behind it. A
number of domestic constitutional courts have in fact taken the hybrid nature of
norms stemming from the implementation of EU directives seriously. The
Estonian and the German constitutional courts have decided that those norms are
in general not objects of constitutional review unless the directive has given some
leeway of implementation.63 A similar approach is taken by the French Conseil
Constitutionnel64 and Conseil d’État.65 The latter reviews those norms only in
cases in which the content of the relevant constitutional law provision is not
already guaranteed by EU law itself. This approach embraces normative
intertwinement not only with regard to the object of review but also with regard
to its yardstick. The European Court of Justice, as well, has developed case law that
explicitly takes the intertwinement characteristic of the compound structure into
account: at least in principle, it accepts a cumulative fundamental rights review at
the domestic and the EU law level wherever norms resulting from a process of
implementing EU directives are involved.66
In comparison to other approaches attempting to justify the primacy of EU
law, the principle of uniformity has one decisive advantage. It takes all elements of
the compound structure, all perspectives of the individual legal orders, into
account. Doing so, it does not risk following an ‘aggressively purposive’67
63Estonian Constitutional Court, decision n. 3-3-1-33-06 of 5 October 2006; German
Constitutional Court, decision of 13 March 2007, BvF 1/05, para. 69. A slightly different approach
that, however, takes the hybrid nature of norms resulting from the implementation of directives into
account, can be found in the jurisprudence of the Lithuanian Constitutional Court, decision of 8
May 2007, Case 47/04, section II.
64Conseil Constitutionnel, decision of 10 June 2004, n. 2004-496 DC, considérants 8-9.
65Conseil d’État (Ass.), decision of 8 February 2007, n. 287110.
66ECJ 26 February 2013, Case C-617/10, Åkerberg Fransson, para. 29; ECJ 26 February 2013,
Case C-399/11, Melloni, para. 60.
67Kumm, supra n. 57, p. 45.
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approach like the one adopted by the European Court of Justice. The uniform
application of legal norms throughout all participating legal orders is a
consideration that transcends adopting a merely functional European
perspective. Rather, it reflects the normative link between the EU and the
Member States. The principle of uniformity as understood here is not limited by a
self-referential, order-specific narrative that only takes the perspective of one legal
order into account.68 Whereas a perspectivist approach only refers to the
uniformity of the EU legal order, the uniformity addressed by this paper is a
holistic concept, the compound structure as a whole being the point of reference.
The holistic nature of the principle of uniformity understood as a structural
principle stems from its foundation in both European and domestic law. The fact
that the principle often plays out in favour of the European law norm when it is
used for ranking norms therefore does not affect the holistic nature of the
principle. What is important is that both the perspective of the EU and the
perspective of the Member States on what the interplay of norms should look like
are taken seriously. At the domestic level, constitutional provisions and the case
law of constitutional and supreme courts in particular offer valuable components
for the construction of this interlinkage.69
Principle of guaranteed constitutional identity
The second structural principle suggested here to guide the interrelations between
legal norms in the European context is the principle of guaranteed constitutional
identity.70 During recent years, constitutional identity has become the primary
68On the critique of a self-referential approach, see Burchardt, supra n. 3, p. 152-154, p. 179-181.
69Domestic law provisions of that kind are, for instance, Art. 88-1 of the French Constitution,
Art. 29(4) n 4 and 5 of the Irish Constitution, Art. 7(5) and (6) of the Portuguese Constitution, Art.
23 of the German Constitution, article E of the Hungarian Constitution, Art. 143 of the Croatian
Constitution, the Constitutional Act of the Republic of Lithuania on membership of the Republic of
Lithuania in the European Union; rudimentarily also chapter 10, Art. 6 of the Swedish
constitutional act ‘Instrument of Government’, Art. 4(3) of the Bulgarian Constitution.
70For the scholarly debate about constitutional identity, see e.g. L. Besselink, ‘National and
Constitutional Identity before and after Lisbon’, 6 Utrecht LR (2010) p. 36; J.M. Beneyto and I.
Pernice (eds.), Europe’s Constitutional Challenges in the Light of the Recent Case Law of National
Constitutional Courts (Nomos 2011); P. Faraguna, ‘Constitutional Identity in the EU–A Shield or
a Sword?’, 18 German Law Journal (2017) p. 1617; T. Konstadinides, ‘Constitutional Identity as a
Shield and as a Sword: The European Legal Order within the Framework of National Constitutional
Settlement’, 13 Cambridge Ybk European Legal Studies (2010-2011) p. 195; Z. Körtvélyesi and B.
Majtényi, ‘Game of Values: The Threat of Exclusive Constitutional Identity, the EU and Hungary’,
18 German Law Journal (2017) p. 1721; K. Kovács, ‘The Rise of an Ethnocultural Constitutional
Identity in the Jurisprudence of the East Central European Courts’, 18 German Law Journal (2017)
p. 1703; X. Millet, L’Union européenne et l’identité constitutionnelle des États membres (LGDJ 2013);
M. Polzin, ‘Constitutional Identity as a Constructed Reality and a Restless Soul’, 18 German Law
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point of reference both in scholarly writing71 and in the case law of domestic
courts72 when it comes to finding a legal basis for exceptions to the EU law claim
of absolute primacy.73 Although the notion of constitutional identity has been
phrased in different manners, and has been used as a political tool by member
states in some cases more prominently than in others, the developing narrative
reflects a common constitutional consideration.74 The claim of the absolute
primacy of EU law is challenged more often and openly than before. This is due to
the fact that, unlike some domestic reservations related to the general human
rights protection at the EU level, constitutional identity is primarily applied on a
case-by-case basis. It not only refers to a general standard of protection but also to
the relationship between norms in an individual case. In this regard, the
predominant way the notion is presently used is as a ‘sword’ to resolve specific
norm conflicts in favour of domestic law rather than as a ‘shield’ against further
integration through the adoption of primary European law.75
However, the structural principle of guaranteed constitutional identity as
understood here is not to be equated with individual domestic concepts of
constitutional identity. Instead, it has a European and a domestic dimension and
its normative basis is both EU law and domestic law. As a structural principle, it
Journal (2017) p. 1595; J.-H. Reestman, ‘The Franco-German Constitutional Divide – Reflections
on National and Constitutional Identity’, 5 EuConst (2009) p. 374; A. Saiz Arnaiz and C. Alcoberro
Llivina (eds.), National Constitutional Identity and European Integration (Intersentia 2013); T.
Wischmeyer, ‘Nationale Identität und Verfassungsidentität. Schutzgehalte, Instrumente,
Perspektiven’, 140 Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts (2015) p. 415.
71E.g. Kumm, supra n. 7, p. 303; A. von Bogdandy and S. Schill, ‘Overcoming absolute primacy:
Respect for national identity under the Lisbon Treaty’, 28 CMLR (2011) p. 1417; criticising these
approaches van der Schyff, supra n. 58, p. 572-573; see also Advocate General Maduro, Opinion 8
October 2008, Case C-213/07, Michaniki, paras. 32-33. Critical on Art. 4(2) TEU as limit to
primacy, M. Claes, ‘National Identity: Trump Card or up for Negotiation?’, in Saiz Arnaiz and
Alcoberro Llivina, supra n. 70, p. 109.
72See e.g. German Constitutional Court, order of 15 December 2015, 2 BvR 2735/14; French
Conseil Constitutionnel, decision of 27 July 2006, n. 2006-540 DC, considérant 19; Polish
Constitutional Court, decision of 24 November 2010, K 32/09, section 2.1; Czech Constitutional
Court, decision of 26 November 2008, Pl. US. 19/08; Italian Constitutional Court, order of 23
November 2016, n. 24/2017, §6; Hungarian Constitutional Court, decision of 30 November 2016,
22/2016. (XII. 5.) AB; in an obiter dictum: Belgian Constitutional Court No. 62/2016, 28 April
2016, B.8.7.
73The ECJ, however, has been reluctant to refer to the concept of national identity although it had
been discussed in the respective Opinions of the Advocate Generals: judgment of 16 June 2015,
Case C-62/14,Gauweiler; judgment of 13March 2017, Case C-157/15, Samira Achbita; judgement
of 5 December 2017, Case C-42/17, Taricco II.
74On the rising approach of an ‘ethnocultural’ constitutional identity in East Central Europe, see
Kovács, supra n. 70.
75On using constitutional identity as a ‘shield or a sword’, see Faraguna, supra n. 70;
Konstadinides, supra n. 70.
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refers to all legal norms originating from the intertwined legal orders in the
European compound structure and to their interplay. Understood in this way, this
principle reflects the abstract idea of a protected constitutional core that emanates
from European and domestic constitutional orders. Such a holistic understanding
of constitutional identity emphasises that this principle is open to balancing with
other principles and to the process of optimisation attached to that balancing.76
Unlike national identity in Article 4(2) TEU and domestic concepts of
constitutional identity, which are often considered to be of an absolute nature,77
the structural principle of guaranteed constitutional identity does not constitute
an absolute limit. Rather, it only prohibits disproportionate encroachments on
domestic constitutional identity by EU law.78 As a holistic principle, its effects
cannot be determined only from the perspective of a single legal order.79 Rather,
domestic law and EU law combined shape both its content and its effects. This
prevents unilateral use or misuse of the concept of constitutional identity by the
actors of one legal order.80
In substance, this principle requires guaranteeing the constitutional identity of
all legal orders that are part of the European compound structure. Consequently, it
76Von Bogdandy and Schill, supra n. 71, p. 1441; van der Schyff, supra n. 58, p. 579 ff; similar
Advocate General Maduro, Opinion in Michaniki, supra n. 71, at para. 33; as well as Kumm, supra
n. 7, p. 303. On the French conception of a relative constitutional identity see Reestman, supra n. 70,
p. 388.
77On an exclusively domestic law-related argumentation for the absolute nature of constitutional
identity, see German Constitutional Court, Order of 14 January 2014 - 2 BvR 2728/13, at para. 29:
‘Since Art. 79 sec. 3 GG also sets an “ultimate limit” … to the applicability of Union law within the
German jurisdiction under the Basic Law, the principles which are stipulated therein may not be
balanced against other legal interests …’.
78Critical about an absolute limit: Advocate General Cruz Villalón, Opinion in Gauweiler, supra
n. 73, at para. 59: ‘[I]t seems to me an all but impossible task to preserve this Union, as we know it
today, if it is to be made subject to an absolute reservation, ill-defined and virtually at the discretion
of each of the Member States, which takes the form of a category described as “constitutional
identity”’. Similarly, Advocate General Kokott pointed out in his Opinion in Samira Achbita, supra
n. 73, at para. 32: ‘The European Union’s obligation under Article 4(2) TEU to respect the national
identities of its Member States does not in itself support the inference that certain subject areas or
areas of activity are entirely removed from the scope of Directive 2000/78.…National identity does
not therefore limit the scope of the Directive as such, but must be duly taken into account in [its]
interpretation’. See also Advocate General Bot in Opinion of 18 July 2017, Case C-42/17, Taricco II,
para. 180.
79The holistic nature of this structural principle differs from approaches that suggest an EU law
principle of constitutional identity, see Millet, supra n. 70, part 2.
80Unilaterally focused on the European perspective: M. Wendel, ‘Lisbon before the Courts:
Comparative Perspectives’, in J.M. Beneyto and I. Pernice (eds.), Europe’s Constitutional Challenges
in the Light of the Recent Case Law of National Constitutional Courts (Nomos 2011) p. 65 at p. 103.
On the problematic use of the concept by Hungary, see G. Halmai, ‘National(ist) constitutional
identity? Hungary’s road to abuse constitutional pluralism’, EUI Working Paper LAW 2017/08.
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concerns both the identity of the constitutional fabric of the EU and the identity
of the constitutional systems of the Member States.81 In a compound structure,
the essentials of all participating legal orders have to be respected. As Miguel
Poiares Maduro has put it: there is ‘the requirement […] that any legal order
(national or European) must respect the identity of the other legal orders; its
identity must not be affirmed in a manner that either challenges the identity of the
other legal orders or the pluralist conception of the European legal order itself.’82
With reference to the individual legal norm, this means that a norm can both
reflect the identity of its ‘own’ constitutional order and affect the identity of
another legal order. Both these dimensions have to be taken into account when
determining the relationship between legal norms stemming from different legal
orders.
Compared to the first structural principle (principle of uniformity), the
principle of guaranteed constitutional identity has an opposing orientation.
Whereas the principle of uniformity sets a general standard guiding the
interrelation of norms, this second principle serves as a corrective to the
individual rank relationship established by the principle of uniformity. Whereas
the latter orients the relationship between norms in favour of a primacy of the EU
law norm, the constitutional identity of a domestic legal order embodied in a
specific domestic law norm can be an obstacle to that primacy. In such cases, the
two structural principles (uniformity and guaranteed constitutional identity)
conflict. This conflict can be resolved by a mutual ‘relativisation’ and optimisation
of both principles. In particular, this entails a substantive relativisation of the
primacy claim of EU law. However, given the merely relative effect of both
principles, the aspect of constitutional identity will not be able to prevail under all
circumstances. Rather, it needs to be reconciled with the principle of uniformity,
thereby allowing the optimisation of both principles. This requires a more
differentiated conflict resolution.
The principle of guaranteed constitutional identity is a genuine reflection of the
compound structure of the European legal space. On the one hand, it safeguards
elements specific to a certain legal order, which expresses the order’s relative
81On the question of an EU constitutional identity, see W. Sadurski, ‘European Constitutional
Identity?’, EUI Working Paper LAWNo. 2006/33. On the idea of a European compound structure
of identity formed by the EU and its Member States, see E. Pache, ‘Europäische und nationale
Identität: Integration durch Verfassungsrecht?’, 117 DVBl (2002) p. 1154 at p. 1167.
82Maduro, supra n. 60, p. 526. A similar approach is taken by the Polish Constitutional Court
regarding its reservation for constitutional identity (although primarily with regard to the
relationship amongst Member States), see K 32/09 (Lisbon Treaty), decision of 24/11/2010, section
2.1: ‘The idea of confirming one’s national identity in solidarity with other nations, and not against
them, constitutes the main axiological basis of the European Union, in the light of the Treaty of
Lisbon’.
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autonomy. It is a ‘principle that protects the diversity’ in the EU.83 At the same
time, it contributes to replacing the traditional understanding of absolute
autonomy and to establishing a relative and norm-based ranking of legal norms.
On the other hand, the principle of guaranteed constitutional identity is not
isolated but can interact with other structural principles, thus becoming an
element of complementarity and intertwinement. When it is integrated into a
differentiated model of conflict resolution, it interconnects both the concerned
groups of norms and the relevant actors.
Differentiated conflict resolution
When weighing the principles of uniformity and guaranteed constitutional
identity, norm-applying actors should consider the aspect of cooperation – one of
the characteristic elements of multi-level constitutionalism reflecting
complementarity. The norm-based compound structure created by EU and
domestic law enables and requires a cooperative framework in which the relevant
European and domestic actors can contribute to achieving a differentiated
approach to resolving conflicts of norms. Such a differentiated approach can be
attained in various ways.
In the interest of balancing the opposing structural principles appropriately, a
relationship involving ranking should, first of all, differentiate regarding the nature
of the EU law norms against which the identity argument is addressed. In this
respect, the first differentiation that necessarily comes to mind is the one between
EU primary and secondary law.84 This refers to the idea that the law-making and
law-applying actors in the European and domestic legal orders are responsible for
guaranteeing respect for the constitutional identity of both their own legal order
and the other legal orders affected by their actions. Member States have the
responsibility to ensure that their ‘own’ constitutional identity remains unaffected
and to take the necessary initiatives required by their constitutions. However, this
is not possible to the same extent with regard to EU primary and secondary law.
Whereas secondary law can generally be created against the will of a minority of
Member States, Article 48 TEU requires unanimity for treaty making and treaty
amendments.85 As a consequence, one can (and should) presume that the EU
primary law does not run counter to the constitutional identity of the domestic
legal orders, given that the Member States consented to it during the process of
norm creation. During the legislative process of primary law creation, the Member
83On the necessity to respect such principles that protect diversity, see A. von Bogdandy,
‘Grundprinzipien’, in von Bogdandy and Bast, supra n. 21, p. 13 at p. 52 ff; Tietje, supra n. 5, p. 51.
84Similarly, van der Schyff, supra n. 58, p. 582.
85On the secondary law-making procedures, B. de Witte, ‘Legal Instruments and Law-Making in
the Lisbon Treaty’, in S. Griller and J. Ziller (eds.), The Lisbon Treaty (Springer 2008) p. 79 at p. 97.
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States have sufficient instruments to ensure that the normative content of EU
primary law does not run counter to the imperative standards of their domestic
constitutional frameworks.86 This presumption addresses the Member States as
unitary actors (as is often the case in the EU law context). This means that,
although domestic actors within a state might have diverging opinions on
constitutional identity issues, this is an internal matter only. What counts is the
possibility for the Member States to intervene. Thus, once the law-making process
has been completed, the element of domestic constitutional identity retreats into
the background. As a result, the standard set by the principle of uniformity should
remain untouched in this context: the primacy of EU primary law over domestic
law should be absolute. Even if a Member State has failed to ensure respect for its
constitutional identity (although it had the possibility to do so during the law-
making procedure), the rules of EU primary law will trump any conflicting
domestic law norm. As respect for the domestic constitutional identity can be
guaranteed differently, the principle of uniformity is able to prevail in situations of
norm conflict. Conversely, no presumption of this kind exists for EU secondary
law. Here, a cooperative approach requires that constitutional identity
considerations are taken into account by all actors when applying secondary law.
The only situation that could potentially rebut the presumption regarding
primary law relates to the interpretation given to a primary law norm by the
European Court of Justice. If a Member State argues that during the law-making
process the concrete meaning given to a norm by the Court was impossible to
predict and, therefore, it was impossible for the Member State to ensure its
constitutional identity during that process, the principle of guaranteeing
constitutional identity could be revived. In such exceptional circumstances, the
presumption that a primary law norm trumps a conflicting domestic law norm
could, therefore, be rebutted.
A similar differentiation based on the consent given by the Member States
during the law-making process has also been adopted by the French
Constitutional Court. In its case law, it initially develops a reservation
concerning the primacy of EU law in cases in which the French constitutional
identity is affected. It then, however, modifies this reservation and declares it to be
inapplicable whenever the French constitutional legislature has consented to the
EU law norm in question.87 This case law relates to the responsibility for
guaranteeing France’s ‘own’ constitutional identity and deduces from this
responsibility the limited invocability of the identity argument vis-à-vis the
86On mechanism of taking constitutional identity into account during EU law creation, see
Millet, supra n. 70, part 2.
87Conseil Constitutionnel, decision of 9 June 2011, n. 2011-631 DC, para. 45.
99The law of the European Union and the law its Member States
primacy claim of EU law. This case law is a first step towards a method of
differentiation like the one suggested in this paper.
The second type of differentiation suggested here asks how intensely the
constitutional identity is affected in a specific situation. Given that the principle of
guaranteed constitutional identity is oriented towards correcting – in exceptional
circumstances – the ranking of norms established by the principle of uniformity, a
certain intensity of the way in which a specific component of constitutional
identity is affected should be required for this principle to prevail. When an
element belonging to the constitutional identity of a domestic legal order is merely
touched upon, this cannot be sufficient grounds to challenge the ‘normal’ ranking
of norms established by the principle of uniformity. If the constitutional identity is
affected to a considerable degree, only then can it alter the structures of the norm
relationships. Such a requirement of intensity prevents one legal order from
invoking its constitutional identity against the constitutional identity of the other
legal order in a disproportionate manner.88 Invoking the constitutional identity
should fall under the requirement of proportionality. First, this might contribute
to restraining political use or abuse of the concept and to assuring that actors
invoke the identity argument in a cooperative manner. Second, it guarantees that
the structural principles of uniformity and constitutional identity are balanced in a
way that leads to their respective optimisation.89
The suggested intensity-related differentiation with regard to the effect of the
principle of guaranteed constitutional identity can be linked to the case law of the
European Court of Justice. Although the court has not yet addressed
constitutional identity explicitly, the decisions in Omega90 and Michaniki91 can
be taken as a point of reference for a differentiated approach. They indicate a non-
absolute invocability of arguments grounded on domestic constitutional
identity.92 In comparison, the Court attributes a different weight to arguments
of domestic constitutional law depending on how prominent the relevant
constitutional rule or principle is for its respective domestic legal order. In the
more recent Taricco II case, the court also emphasises the importance of the
constitutional principle at stake in that case.93 While this might indicate that, here
again, the weight of the Member State’s argument is based on how prominent the
domestic constitutional norm is, the court, however, leaves open the extent to
88See on this aspect, Maduro, supra n. 60, p. 526.
89R. Alexy, Theorie der Grundrechte (Suhrkamp 1985) p. 71 ff.
90ECJ 14 October 2004, Case C-36/02, Omega Spielhallen- und Automatenaufstellungs.
91ECJ 16 December 2008, Case C-213/07, Michaniki.
92Besselink, supra n. 70, p. 48-49; O. Pollicino, ‘New Emerging Judicial Dynamics of the
Relationship Between National and the European Courts after the Enlargement of Europe’, 29 YEL
(2010) p. 65 at p. 95-96.
93ECJ 5 December 2017, Case C-42/17, at 51.
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which this prominence specifically influences the decision. A more explicit
reference to an intensity-related differentiation was made in Sayn-Wittgenstein94
and Runevič-Vardyn.95 Recognising the republican form of government in Austria
as well as the official language of Lithuania as elements of national identity in the
sense of Article 4(2) TEU, the Court differentiated between domestic
constitutional norms of greater and lesser importance and between the intensity
by which the respective domestic national identity is affected. An intensity-related
differentiation is thus not foreign to the case law of the European Court of
Justice.96
If the aspect of constitutional identity is to have an impact on specific relations
between norms, it has to be determined what constitutional identity actually is
and of which concrete elements it is composed. Given that these elements
originate from a specific legal order, one possible approach would be to have
exclusively the actors belonging to the respective legal order determine the content
of constitutional identity. Constitutional norms, as well as the case law of the
constitutional courts, would then constitute the main point of reference. As a
consequence, the Member States could unilaterally determine the content of what
constitutes an exception to the primacy of EU law. That is the approach taken by
several constitutional courts in this matter.97
However, in the context of applying the principle of guaranteed constitutional
identity, the compound structure formed by EU law and domestic law should be
taken into account. The elements that belong to the constitutional identity of a
specific legal order should be concretised by both EU and domestic actors.98 A
unilateral determination of what constitutional identity means is not compatible
with this approach. Along these lines, Advocate General Cruz Villalón has warned
against an absolute reservation of constitutional identity ‘virtually at the discretion
of each of the Member States’.99
Constitutional identity applied as an element of norm-based intertwinement
requires that all concerned legal orders be involved. For the relevant actors, this
94ECJ 22 December 2010, Case C-208/09, Sayn-Wittgenstein, in particular paras. 92 ff.
95ECJ 12 May 2011, Case C-391/09, Runevič-Vardyn, paras. 83 ff.
96Other decisions on this issue include ECJ 12 June 2014, Case C-156/13, Digibet and Albers, at
para. 34; ECJ 16 April 2013, Case C-202/11, Anton Las v PSA Antwerp NV, at para. 26.
97See e.g. Italian Constitutional Court, order of 23 November 2016, n. 24/2017; German
Constitutional Court, order of 15 December 2015, 2 BvR 2735/14, in particular paras. 40-50; order
of 14 January 2014, 2 BvE 13/13, at 29
98On involving the ECJ in this determining process, see also Claes, supra n. 71, p. 109; C. Grewe,
‘Methods of Identification of National Constitutional Identity’, in Saiz Arnaiz and Alcoberro
Llivina, supra n. 70, p. 37.
99Advocate General Cruz Villalón, Opinion of 14 January 2015, Case C-62/14, Gauweiler et al.,
at p. 59. A similar approach is taken by Advocate General Bot, Opinion in Taricco II, supra n. 78,
at 180.
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entails a cooperative approach. As a first step, the prima facie concretisation should
be generally carried out by domestic actors, the reason being that the legal order
whose constitutional identity is affected is, of course, better situated to specify the
content of the constitutional identity of a certain legal order. However, as a second
step, it is both conceptually required and practically feasible to complement the
domestic determination with a European equivalent. The content of domestic
constitutional identity should be determined primarily by domestic actors – but in
the framework of EU law. A possible mechanism could be to use a ‘plausibility
check’ as a follow-up at the level of EU law. This would limit the risk of Member
States engaging in a too extensive or not sufficiently justified interpretation of
constitutional identity.100 Taking up, for instance, the aspect of intensity
mentioned above, one of the roles at the European level could be to check whether
the argument of the domestic actors is plausible, i.e. that the constitutional
identity of their legal order is in fact affected to a considerable degree. By installing
this kind of plausibility check, the intensity-related differentiation and the element
of control at the EU level could be combined. This would provide an additional
element of restraint regarding the potential political use or abuse of the concept of
constitutional identity. What is more, such a complementary model would
properly reflect the idea of dialogue101 between the different legal orders and their
respective actors, an idea that defines the existing European compound structure
and that is preferable to a narrative of ‘rebellion’102 or ‘resistance’103 on the part of
domestic courts.
A further argument for a cooperative approach is provided by looking closely at
the norms involved in a particular conflict. In the case of a conflict between an EU
norm reflecting uniformity and a norm reflecting domestic constitutional identity,
an additional internal EU norm conflict occurs between the EU norm reflecting
the principle of uniformity and Article 4(2) TEU.104 Hence, the conflict, in fact,
involves a multipolar relationship between a domestic norm and various EU law
norms. As the relationship is not merely internal to either the EU or domestic legal
100Regarding Art. 4(2) TEU, some have even claimed that only elements of national identity
which respect the fundamental values of the EU can be considered under European law, see J.-P.
Jacqué, ‘L’évolution des rapports entre le droit de l’Union et le droit national du point de vue de
l’Union’, in J. Schwarze (ed.), Das Verhältnis von nationalem Recht und Europarecht im Wandel der
Zeit (tome 1, Nomos 2012) p. 33 at p. 36.
101Also emphasising dialogue in this context, Claes, supra n. 71.
102A. Arnull and D. Wyatt, European Union Law, 5th edn (Sweet & Maxwell 2006) p. 142.
103Concurring opinion by Judge Béla Pokol to Hungarian Constitutional Court Decision 22/
2016 (XII. 5.) AB: ‘the constitutional courts’ abstract right of resistance against the legal acts of the
Union’ (emphasis added).
104On this aspect of the conflict, see also Spanish Constitutional Court, declaration of 13
December 2004, DTC 1/2004.
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order, the conflict should not be resolved exclusively by either domestic or
European norm applying bodies. In particular, it would be too one-sided to
deduce from the European Court of Justice’s interpretative competence with
respect to Article 4(2) TEU a unilateral capacity to resolve such conflicts. Rather,
the multipolar nature of the norm conflict should translate into a cooperative
relationship between European and domestic courts and other norm applying
bodies.105 A unilateral decision risks having the involved structural principles not
being balanced sufficiently.106 It should be kept in mind that only a combination
of both principles, uniformity and guaranteed constitutional identity, can set the
framework for resolving specific conflicts of norms.
Conclusion
The paper has highlighted how the often-claimed intertwinement of EU and
domestic law plays out in detail. It has suggested a way to conceptualise the specific
forms of intertwinement and their structural consequences at the level of legal
theory. It has shown how elements of autonomy and intertwinement, of
heterarchy and hierarchy, can coexist. Further, the paper has demonstrated how a
norm-based approach to the relationship between EU and domestic law can
contribute to overcoming a perspectivist approach. The concept of a norm-based
compound structure introduced in this paper embraces a holistic understanding of
both the nature of the legal norms contained in the compound structure and the
legal tools to resolve conflicts between those norms. This approach contributes to
strengthening the analytical and normative framework for understanding the
interrelations between norms. Especially in situations of conflicting norms in an
inter-order dimension, the compound structure provides for structural principles
– the principles of uniformity and guaranteed constitutional identity – which
should be used to enable holistic and differentiated conflict resolution. This offers
a balanced approach to address the claims of supremacy and constitutional identity
lodged by the actors in the European constitutional setting.
105Some suggest an ‘Identity Committee’ as ad hoc body in cases concerning constitutional
identity, see J. Villotti, ‘National Constitutional Identity and the Legitimacy of the European Union
– Two Sides of the European Coin’, 18 ZEuS (2015) p. 475.
106On this danger, see also Pollicino, supra n. 92, p. 97.
103The law of the European Union and the law its Member States
